| Hacking, I. (2008). Entre science et réalité: La construction sociale de quoi ? B. Jurdant, Trans. Paris: Éditions La Découverte. |
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| Last edited by: Dominique Meeùs 2013-02-24 00:34:57 |
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| Les premières années du 20e siècle correspondent en effet à une époque révolutionnaire. Einstein avait détrôné Kant, tandis que le raisonnement intuitionniste de Brouwer mettait Aristote en question. Dans la même ligne figuraient Lénine et la nouvelle mécanique quantique, l’un tendant de défaire le capitalisme, et l’autre s'attaquant à la causalité. |
| Meulders, M. (2001). Helmholtz: Des lumières aux neurosciences. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob. |
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| Last edited by: Dominique Meeùs 2013-01-13 09:03:35 |
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La Naturphilosophie oppose à la vision mécanique et quantitative de Newton et à la rigueur de l’entendement kantien, la connaissance globale, intuitive et qualitative, d’une nature animée par l’esprit. Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling en est le philosophe fondateur et autour de lui gravitent de nombreux personnages parfois hauts en couleur, religieux et poètes, médecins et physiciens, inspirés par la Naturphilosophie à des degrés divers, parfois avec outrance. Peut-être n’aurait-il cependant pas été le philosophe que nous connaissons aujourd’hui, s’il n’y avait pas eu, trente ans avant la publication de ses travaux, une période d’intense activité littéraire appelée « Sturm und Drang », sorte de prologue à l’ère de la Naturphilosophie et du savoir romantique.
Ce mouvement exprimait le mal-être d’une génération en révolte contre celle qui la précédait : il s’élevait notamment contre les valeurs propres aux Lumières, et prônait à leur place le retour à la nature, au Moyen Âge et aux anciennes valeurs populaires. Ce fut pourtant loin d’être une vague de fond généralisée, et encore moins une révolution. Né pour les historiens en 1770, le « Stunn und Drang » ne dura guère plus qu’une dizaine d’années et n’empêcha pas les acteurs des Lumières de poursuivre leurs activités, puisque c’est en 1776 que Lessing publia Nathan le Sage, éloge d’une tolérance digne des Lumières, et en 1784 seulement, que Kant écrivit son essai Qu’est-ce que les Lumières ? Ce fut pourtant un moment fort de la littérature, puisque pour la première fois un roman allemand, le Werther de Goethe (1774), envahit l’Europe entière et se retrouva même sur la table de nuit de Napoléon. |
| Weinberg, S. (1993). Dreams of a final theory: Search for the ultimate laws of nature. Londres: Hutchinson Radius. |
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| Last edited by: Dominique Meeùs 2011-05-03 08:46:32 |
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Even where philosophical doctrines have in the past been useful to scientists, they have generally lingered on too long, becoming of more harm than ever they were of use. Take, for example, the venerable doctrine of « mechanism », the idea that nature operates through pushes and pulls of material particles or fluids. In the ancient world no doctrine could have been more progressive. Ever since the pre-Socratic philosophers Democritus and Leucippus began to speculate about atoms, the idea that natural phenomena have mechanical causes has stood in opposition to popular beliefs in gods and demons. The Hellenistic cult leader Epicurus brought a mechanical worldview into his creed specifically as an antidote to belief in the Olympian gods. When René Descartes set out in the 1630s on his great attempt to understand the world in rational terms, it was natural that he should describe physical forces like gravitation in a mechanical way, in terms of vortices in a material fluid filling all space. The « mechanical philosophy » of Descartes had a powerful influence on Newton, not because it was right (Descartes did not seem to have the modern idea of testing theories quantitatively) but because it provided an example of the sort of mechanical theory that could make sense out of nature. Mechanism reached its zenith in the nineteenth century, with the brilliant explanation of chemistry and heat in terms of atoms. And even today mechanism seems to many to be simply the logical opposite to superstition. In the history of human thought the mechanical worldview has played a heroic role.
That is just the trouble. In science as in politics or economics we are in great danger from heroic ideas that have outlived their usefulness.The heroic past of mechanism gave it such prestige that the followers of Descartes had trouble accepting Newton’s theory of the solar system. How could a good Cartesian, believing that all natural phenomena could be reduced to the impact of material bodies or fluids on one another, accept Newton’s view that the sun exerts a force on the earth across 93 million miles of empty space ? It was not until well into the eighteenth century that Continental philosophers began to feel comfortable with the idea of action at a distance. In the end Newton’s ideas did prevail on the Continent as well as in Britain, in Holland, Italy, France, and Germany (in that order) from 1720 on. To be sure, this was partly due to the influence of philosophers like Voltaire and Kant. But here again the service of philosophy was a negative one ; it helped only to free science from the constraints of philosophy itself.
Even after the triumph of Newtonianism, the mechanical tradition continued to flourish in physics. The theories of electric and magnetic fields developed in the nineteenth century by Michael Faraday and James Clerk Maxwell were couched in a mechanical framework, in terms of tensions within a pervasive physical medium, often called the ether. Nineteenth-century physicists were not behaving foolishly — all physicists need some sort of tentative worldview to make progress, and the mechanical worldview seemed as good a candidate as any. But it survived too long. |
